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Abstract 
Public organizations account for their performance through making public sector 
performance information publicly available, both to politicians through performance 
reporting, and to citizens through rankings, websites, and performance reports. This 
chapter reviews whether performance reporting makes public organizations more 
accountable: Do citizens and politicians actually consult and use performance 
information, and does this information change their decisions and behaviours? The 
chapter first looks at the use of performance metrics in political decision making, 
drivers of this use, and differences in use across groups. It subsequently reviews the 
literature on whether citizens use publicly available performance indicators and 
rankings to make an informed choice between alternative service providers. The focus 
is on school and hospital performance data. The chapter ends by discussing 
implications on equity, power relations, and the internal dynamics of organizations. 
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 Performance reporting: what it is and where it comes from 
There is a trend to making more and more public sector performance information 
publicly available, both to politicians through performance reporting, and to citizens 
through rankings, websites, and performance reports. The assumption is that 
performance reporting makes public organizations more accountable: Citizens can 
collectively consult league tables and decide about whether they want to continue 
using the service. The ultimate punishment for poor performance is an abandonment 
of the service and a transfer to an alternative provider. Politicians and boards can use 
performance information to decide about budget allocations, appointments, or 
emergency measures. 
The gradual shift to New Public Management (NPM) from the mid-1980s 
meant a change in public sector accountability. The introduction of various ex-post 
mechanisms to account for performance supplemented traditional ex-ante legal 
mechanisms. What is generally meant by an accountable public sector in this context 
is a public sector that is answerable for its performance (Romzek 2000; Hyndman and 
Anderson 1998). This means that organizations’ accounting systems were joined by a 
series on non-financial reporting systems (Dubnick 2005, 385–6), and that 
performance was added as a key organizational value. Rather than concentrating on 
controlling the use of public authority and providing assurance of abiding by rules and 
values in public spending, accountability mechanisms increasingly came to be seen as 
mechanisms facilitating improvement of public services (Aucoin and Heintzman 
2000; Bovens, Schillemans, and ‘t Hart 2008). The focus of accountability systems 
also changed through an increasing importance of external accountability (i.e. to 
citizens) and a shift from process to output and outcome. 
 Accountability, or “being called to account for one’s actions” (Mulgan 2000, 
570), gradually came to be defined as demonstrating one’s performance. This new 
approach to account-giving—accountability for performance—required explicit 
standards of performance (Behn 2001). By defining accountability as being 
answerable for performance, it would obviously be necessary to produce performance 
information. Subsequent decades thus saw an increase in performance management 
systems, often (misleadingly) labeled and branded as accountability systems (Radin 
2006). They were not just supposed to work as naming and shaming mechanisms, but 
through providing information these performance management systems would 
contribute to a learning process and in this way improve performance (Bovens, 
Schillemans, and ‘t Hart 2008). An increase in transparency and thus accountability is 
an important goal in itself and the mere possibility of holding organizations 
accountable for their actions is considered to be highly valued by the public (Mayne 
2007; Werner, and Asch 2005). 
What makes accounting for performance different? 
The effects of accounting for performance extend beyond the mere provision of 
information to facilitating a different style of decision-making. Through better 
performance information, public organizations would learn more about their own 
performance. Providing politicians and boards with detailed sets of performance 
metrics, it was thought, would support them in holding public officials, departments, 
front-line delivery bodies, and autonomous agencies to account, and help them to take 
better decisions. Furthermore, such information would help to maintain a healthy level 
of knowledge-based trust between principals and agents (Van de Walle 2010). 
Citizens would be able to use performance information to put pressure on 
public services and politicians and to make better-informed choices when using public 
 services (Van de Walle and Roberts 2008). In the new “performance management 
doctrine,” the nature of accountability would be changed, both for the public, by 
making government actions transparent (external accountability), and for elected 
officials by reducing information asymmetries (internal accountability) (Moynihan 
2008, 10–11, 35). The key mode of such transparency was through making 
performance information available to policy makers and to the wider public. It was 
assumed that through these two pressures, from citizens, and from politicians and 
boards, greater accountability would lead to increased performance (Dubnick 2005). 
Whereas traditional accountability about the performance of public services to 
citizens was mediated through elected bodies (DeLeon 1998), citizen-oriented reforms 
introduced a direct accountability relationship between (individual) citizens and 
public services through making performance information publicly available and 
through introducing complaints mechanisms, ombudsmen, etc. Democratic 
accountability mediated through elected bodies was partly replaced by direct 
accountability to users, and by accountability organized by the central government 
through an elaborate system of targets and monitoring systems (Greener 2009, 51–8). 
The former shift fits within a broader shift from vertical to horizontal accountability 
(Bovens 2005). This change also meant that individual civil servants and individual 
services could now also be called to account. 
The effects of performance reporting on accountability and decisions 
Despite the high-minded rhetoric about accounting for performance, reality is less 
accommodating. Performance measurement, performance management and 
performance-based accountability are generally connected in theory, but less so in 
practice (Thomas and Winnipeg 2007). Process-based accountability continues to 
dominate practice. One reason for this failure is that “accountability for results is 
 possible only where goals are clear, and accountability for process is possible only 
where there is general agreement as to which processes are the most (or the only) 
appropriate ones—the ‘best practices’, in management vernacular” (DeLeon 1998, 
546). This is less than straightforward in a policy context. Accountability is often used 
as a solution to all sorts of organizational problems, and the link between performance 
information and accountability has become highly embedded in organizational 
rhetoric (Dubnick 2005). The real question is: do these accountability mechanisms 
work (Bovens, Schillemans, and ‘t Hart 2008), and does publishing of performance 
information lead to more accountability and hence better performance? 
In this chapter we mainly concentrate on two accountability relations mainly 
affected by an increased availability of performance information: accountability to 
citizens by making performance information publicly available and accounting to 
politicians by providing them with performance metrics about the organization. Both 
topics are receiving increasing attention in the literature (Van Dooren and Van de 
Walle 2008). Providing politicians and citizens with more performance information 
has been the answer to improving accountability, but do these two groups actually use 
performance information in taking decisions? 
Is performance information used in political decision making? 
Politicians wanting to control large and complex public services need easily 
accessible information to take decisions. This desire for more and better information 
in the policy and budgeting cycle has found expression in various initiatives, all based 
on very rational approaches to policy-making and budgeting (Thomas and Winnipeg 
2007). In order to improve public accountability, many public organizations produce 
considerable amounts of performance information. Such provision of information fits 
well within the principal-agent logic whereby the agent is requested to provide 
 information that helps the principal to steer the agent and make the agent accountable. 
Principals, in a public sector context mainly politicians, are thus assumed to use the 
available performance information to hold the agent accountable. Without such 
performance information, an information deficit and information asymmetry prevent 
the politicians from exercising control. Surprisingly, studies analyzing whether 
politicians actually use such performance information are relatively scarce (Pollitt 
2006), and we have only recently seen an increase in empirical research into the topic. 
Evidence for the limited use of performance information 
The link between performance measurement and decision making and between 
performance metrics and accountability is often assumed. Researchers, however, are 
very skeptical about the usefulness of performance indicators (Askim 2009; Laegreid, 
Roness, and Rubecksen 2006). Academic interest in the “use” of (performance) 
information has so far been rather limited (Pollitt 2006, 41). Much of the evidence on 
whether the information coming from performance measurement is actually used in 
decision-making is anecdotal (De Lancer Julnes, and Holzer 2001), and opinion on 
whether performance measurement actually matters for decisions is divided (Ho 2005, 
18; Askim 2009). 
We have seen a growing number of studies of how politicians use performance 
information (Ho 2005; Bogt 2004; Johnsen 2005; Brun and Siegel 2006). A common 
finding in this research is that politicians often do not value the performance 
information. Pollitt focused on the use of performance reports by end-users, and the 
evidence he reviewed “suggests that evaluation and performance reports and audits 
are seldom highly valued by politicians or citizens” (Pollitt 2006, 38). Aldermen in 
the Netherlands use performance information infrequently, and do not always see 
much value in the available information (Bogt 2004). Pollitt reviewed evidence that 
 indicated that Auditor General’s reports in Canada were not read in their entirety by 
Canadian Members of Parliament (MPs) and that performance information is not 
really used in budgeting decisions in the US (Pollitt 2006). In decision-making, 
political considerations and performance information are used (Heinrich 1999), but 
we know little about their respective weight, and about the contextual factors that 
influence this selection. 
Yet, before discarding performance information because it is not used by 
politicians anyway, we need to recognize that most studies focused on instrumental 
use. Politicians may not pick up performance reports, “read them carefully and then 
set out directly to apply their findings to the reformulation of policy or the better 
management of programmes” (Pollitt 2006, 49), but this does not mean performance 
information is not used at all. Politicians use various ways to collect information, and 
the use of information may be less formalized than what the existence of performance 
reports or league tables suggests. Decision-makers often find little use in performance 
indicators and instead prefer to rely on personal interactions with civil servants (Bogt 
2004). Politicians normally engage in “problemistic search” and seek out 
supplementing sources of information, rather than just relying on one predefined set 
of information (Cyert and March 1963). 
One of the most extensive initiatives to study the use of performance 
information by local politicians can be found in Norway, where several authors have 
studied this phenomenon as part of a large-scale project (Askim 2009; Johnsen 2005). 
Johnsen (2005) studied the use of non-mandatory performance measurement in 
political institutions in Norwegian local government. Askim (2009; 2008) studied 
local politicians’ use of performance information in Norway, with a focus on these 
politicians’ needs and abilities. Some of his findings were “that use of performance 
 information increases with a politician’s rank within the polity; that the politicians 
with the highest education make the least use of performance information; that polity 
size has a positive effect on use; and that different factors matter in distinct ways in 
different phases of policymaking.” 
Differences in performance information use 
Performance information is more embedded in some sectors than in others, and also 
the use of performance information in decision-making differs between policy sectors, 
partly because of a longer data-use tradition, or because of the different nature of 
evidence in these fields (Askim 2005). Van Dooren (2004) found similar differences 
across policy domains in the use of indicators in a study of parliamentary questions in 
the Belgian Parliament. In an encompassing study in Switzerland, Frey and Widmer 
(2011) found that performance information was used to varying degrees between 
different and within single policy fields. In a study among local councilors in Norway, 
use of performance information seemed to be especially relevant for councilors within 
the sectors of elderly care, administrative affairs and education (Askim 2007). Others 
found large differences in patterns of use of performance information depending on 
organizational culture (Moynihan 2005, 204) and country (Pollitt et al. 2010). This is 
in line with more general studies on the use of evidence in policy making (Davies, 
Nutley, and Smith 2000, 3; Nutley and Webb 2000, 14). 
A second set of explanations focuses on the skills and resources required to 
use performance information. The complexity of performance information and the 
costs involved in using and understanding it can pose a barrier for politicians. Pollitt 
suggested that to politicians, speed and to-the-point information are most useful, 
whereas the trend in performance evaluation seems to be an increasing complexity of 
information. As a result, performance evaluation remains the domain of experts and 
 managers, and not politicians—or citizens (Pollitt 2006). Availability of time may 
also explain differences between national research findings (Askim 2009). In their 
study of the influence of performance information on legislative reforms in 
Switzerland, Frey and Widmer (2011) found that the use of information is positively 
associated with the strength of the performance information, as measured by the 
information’s credibility, certainty and consistency. 
The effect of performance information on accountability 
A surprising finding from these studies is that the availability of performance 
information changes information asymmetries, but not always in the expected 
direction. Rather than seeing parliaments get a stronger role in the political game 
through the increased possibilities for holding the government to account, parliaments 
actually appear to lose out in the information war. Johnson and Talbot (2007) looked 
at the extent to which the UK parliament is able to use performance information to 
hold the government to account, and found that “On balance it would seem that it is 
parliament rather than the executive which is currently most challenged by the PSA 
and other performance policy reports.” (2007, 130). Marnoch (2010) found similar 
effects among Scottish MPs, where the executive was also seen to have a monopoly 
on policy information, because “Political issues have become more difficult to 
conceptualize and are consequently increasingly positioned beyond the policy 
competence of parliamentarians operating outside of government with its knowledge-
handling capacities.” (2010, 2). In an earlier study he already stated that MPs often 
use performance information in an act of self-positioning, for instance by challenging 
the integrity of the performance information. Additionally, parliamentarians 
“generally fail to develop a sufficiently sophisticated appreciation of what 
performance means in order to hold government to account.” (2010, 22). 
 There are differences in how politicians use performance information. 
Marnoch looked at health committees in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales and 
found that the political position of the health committee members influences their use 
of performance information. In the Scottish case, committee members who belonged 
to the parties in government and who were promoted to the ministerial office had used 
performance information less often than their colleagues (Marnoch 2010). These 
findings imply that those politicians closest to the center of power and the executive, 
use less performance information and that use of formal performance information is 
higher among those politicians suffering the most from information asymmetries. 
Askim (2009), on the other hand, found that in Norwegian municipalities, politicians 
closer to the apex of power used more performance information. From an 
accountability perspective, one would expect backbenchers to compensate for the 
information asymmetry by using large amounts of performance information, yet 
Askim found that it was frontbenchers in municipal councils who made more use of 
performance information. An exception was the mayor, who used far less 
performance information. Councilors using more performance information also had 
much contact with citizens and municipal employees, thereby further increasing 
information asymmetry. Possible explanations for this finding could be either that 
backbenchers are unaware of the information asymmetry, that the costs for them to 
retrieve performance information are too high, or that they just feel they don’t need 
performance information as much as frontbenchers do. Finally, Askim also found that 
higher-educated and more experienced councilors appear to use less performance 
information than their colleagues. 
Do citizens use performance information? 
 Performance reporting is also directed at citizens. Accounting for performance 
towards citizens is closely related to what is generally labeled the choice agenda, and 
more recently the personalization agenda. Well-informed and benefit-maximizing 
citizens are searching for ways to consume public services that correspond to their 
wishes. They will thus choose between a variety of services offered by an equally 
large variety of public, non-profit and private organizations, and change supplier 
when these services underperform. Publicly available performance indicators assist 
citizens in making informed choices (Le Grand 2007, 84). Through publishing 
performance indicators in easily accessible formats and platforms, public services 
give account of their performance. We will argue in this chapter, as we have done 
earlier, that such an approach presupposes that citizens actually use such performance 
information, and that this information plays a central role in citizens’ choice behavior. 
Public sector reforms, especially from the early 1990s on, gave citizens more 
say in public services. Early changes concentrated mainly on giving citizens more 
voice as customers, through allowing them to file complaints or to go to an 
ombudsman. Greater transparency facilitated such voice, and the publication of 
performance metrics was just one of the expressions of such increased transparency. 
A second set of innovations focused on giving citizens more choice, ultimately 
allowing them to exercise their exit option (Paul 1992; Meijer and Schillemans 2009; 
Besley and Ghatak 2003). Here as well, performance information was regarded as a 
central requirement for such exit to be able to function. It was assumed that citizens, 
after consulting various performance metrics, would choose between a range of 
public, non-profit and private service providers (Van de Walle and Roberts 2008; Le 
Grand 2007). We have thus seen a sharp increase in publicly available performance 
information. This information is not limited to annual reports or publicly available 
 performance reports. Rankings and league tables have also become a common feature, 
especially in the health and education sectors, but also elsewhere. Quite often, such 
performance information is not created by the organizations themselves, but supplied 
through various mediators, such as interests groups, consumer associations, or news 
media. 
While generally regarded as a logical next step in NPM-style reforms of public 
services, few reflected about the assumptions of human behavior behind the voice and 
choice agenda (Clarke et al. 2007). The assumed mechanism behind making 
performance information available to citizens was that citizens are autonomous 
decision-makers (Le Grand 2007) and would 1) actually consult performance 
information before making a decision on which school, hospital, or social service 
provider to use, and 2) would use this information to change their behavior. Because 
the phenomenon of publishing performance information in a format that is easy to use 
for citizens is relatively new, the evidence about whether it is actually used is limited. 
In this section we provide an overview of recent findings in two sectors. Schools and 
hospitals are two types of institutions with which many citizens have direct 
experience. They deliver services in an area where citizens expect high quality, and 
choice is also relatively easy in these sectors. 
Accountability through publishing school performance data 
Education is one of the public services where a substantial amount of performance 
information is publicly available, at different levels, from kindergartens to primary 
and secondary schools to higher education and universities. This information includes 
a variety of data, generally available at the level of individual schools and universities, 
and often offered to the public through a system of rankings and league tables. It 
includes national test results, research output, university application success rates, etc. 
 This information is offered to inform parents or students in order to facilitate them in 
making a conscious and well-informed choice of institution. It also assists voice 
processes by making it easier for parents to see how well their child’s school is doing. 
It is generally assumed that parents and students do use this information, and there is 
indeed substantial evidence that additional information—that is, new information that 
actually contributes to citizens’ knowledge about the quality of an educational 
institution—does have an effect on the choice that is made. For this effect to occur 
however, it is important that this information can easily be retrieved and interpreted. 
By readily presenting this type of information parents were thought to be relieved of 
the necessity to perform an extensive search in order to compare schools, and thus 
face much lower decision-making costs (Hastings and Weinstein 2008). At the same 
time, schools are being forced to perform well if they do not want to be shamed 
publicly and lose pupils. 
Despite the emphasis that has been placed on school performance, though, 
other factors have been found to be at least equally important in choice behavior, 
notably distance to the school (Hastings and Weinstein 2008). The additional costs on 
choice imposed by distance appear not to outweigh school quality as indicated by 
indicators. One study, in which school quality information was published in a national 
newspaper (and, subsequently, in several regional newspapers as well) found that 
students did use quality information, but that they were willing to travel no more than 
an additional 200 meters to attend a better performing school (Koning and Wiel 
2010). Similar studies have focused on the effects of university league tables on 
university choice (Gunn and Hill 2008). 
Accountability through publishing hospital performance data 
 Another area which has seen a sharp increase in publicly available performance 
information is healthcare. Just as was the case with education, the effects of 
publishing performance information on choice behavior are mixed. Some studies 
show a clear effect on patient choice. One such example is about consumers’ choice 
of fertility clinics in the United States. The study found a clear relationship between 
the publication of clinics’ performance information and the choice by consumers of 
certain clinics (Bundorf et al. 2009). 
In other sectors, the effects of public performance metrics on patients’ choice 
seem to be more limited or even absent. Reviews of previous studies on the effects of 
quality information on consumer choice of both health plans and health care providers 
in the US found modest but significant effects (Harris and Buntin 2008; Kolstad and 
Chernew 2009). Jin and Sorensen (2006) correct for the effects of prior known 
information on patients’ decision-making, and find that quality rankings can have a 
significant additional influence on health plan choice. The number of patients actually 
using such information, however, was relatively low in the latter study. In German 
hospitals, although the measured effects were relatively small, the publication of 
performance information did result in changes in patients’ choices: hospitals with 
above average quality turn out to be chosen more often than worse scoring hospitals, 
and worse scoring hospitals are populated mostly by patients living in the direct 
vicinity of that hospital (Sauerland and Wübker 2008). What’s more, hospitals making 
their performance information public also receive more inquiries from prospective 
clients. Analysis of the effects of performance information on choice needs though to 
take availability of alternatives into account. Patients do not necessarily pick the 
hospital closest to their residence (see Le Grand (2007, 101) for an overview of 
 evidence), yet Stevenson (2006) looked at nursing homes and found the absence of 
choice to be a factor limiting the effect of publishing performance information. 
In contrast to the German study on hospital choice mentioned above, a similar 
study in the Netherlands found that patients do not seem to use quality information for 
choosing their hospital. Lako and Rosenau (2009) found that most Dutch patients rely 
on their General Practitioners’ (GP) advice when picking a hospital, instead. Of 31 
percent of patients that did choose their hospital in this study, 14 percent indicated 
that the hospital’s reputation was the main reason for this, and the hospital’s location 
was also found to be an important factor in decision-making. Reputation and other 
peoples’ opinions of health care institutions appear to be an important factor in 
making decisions, putting published performance information well behind GPs’ and 
acquaintances’ opinions as a factor determining patient choice (Lako and Rosenau 
2009). Patients have indicated that they had more confidence in their GPs than in 
formal rankings, especially if they knew their GPs well (Harris and Buntin 2008; 
Marshall et al. 2000). 
Accounting for performance: taking stock 
Did accounting for performance deliver what it promised? 
Performance information takes a central role in public sector reforms. From a 
principal-agent perspective it is seen as a tool to assist politicians and boards in 
holding public service managers (and the government) to account. Towards citizens, 
performance information is presented as a tool assisting them in making informed 
choices between public services and in holding public sector workers and politicians 
accountable. 
The review of the literature revealed overall a relatively limited role for 
performance information. At best, performance information was just one of many 
 elements influencing decisions, and its importance should not be overestimated. 
Further evidence showed inequalities in the use of performance information, 
suggesting that increasing the availability of performance information in order to 
improve accountability relations is not a neutral tool. Yet, the evidence is relatively 
mixed. In the case of politicians’ use of performance information, some studies 
suggest that performance information helps some politicians to correct for their 
relative information deficit. Yet other studies suggested that an increased availability 
of performance information may in fact lead to a widening gap between those who are 
informed and those who aren’t. In this case, performance information does little to 
change accountability processes, yet probably only reinforces existing processes. 
Evidence is also mixed on the effects of making performance information 
available to citizens on their ability and willingness to make informed choices. Even 
though critics have suggested that making performance information publicly available 
will mainly benefit highly-educated citizens, the effects do not seem to be that 
straightforward. Rather, there appear to be important differences between types of 
public services, and the situation within which choices need to be made. Even though 
the added value of performance information in citizens’ choice behavior has generally 
been assumed in public service reforms, there are relatively few studies about how 
citizens actually choose public service providers. If there is one thing that clearly 
emerges from the literature, then it should be that the importance of performance 
information is relatively limited in this choice process. 
The effect of new accountability mechanisms on equity 
Critics of the choice agenda and the related provision of choice-facilitating 
performance information have repeatedly pointed at the fact that making evidence-
based choices is difficult and therefore likely to privilege well-educated citizens and 
 citizens in higher socio-economic classes. Choice has been described by its critics as a 
middle class obsession, even though the evidence on choice behavior does not seem to 
confirm this conviction (Le Grand 2007). Studies do indeed show mixed effects of 
choice on disadvantaged groups. Koning and Wiel (2010) looked at the effects of 
publishing school quality data on school choice, and found no differences in responses 
to performance information between socio-economic groups. Many studies on school 
choice reveal that it is travel time to school rather than the performance information 
provided that determines choice. Publishing performance information to facilitate 
choice therefore only influences choice if there is ample choice of high quality 
schooling in the neighborhood (Hastings and Weinstein 2008). If no such choice is 
available, it is likely to be only those parents with more resources who will make a 
deliberate decision to move their children further afield. 
There is a similar debate in relation to hospital choice. Here, the main 
argument is that health information might be too complicated to assist citizens in 
making informed choices, and that therefore it will mainly be well-educated citizens 
who use such information. In settings where most service users are young, wealthy 
and more highly educated, and the services not acute, such as fertility clinics, there is 
a clear effect of publicly available performance information on clinic choice (Bundorf 
et al. 2009). A review of patient choice in the National Health Service (NHS) found 
that citizens with higher education were more likely to use performance information 
in choosing a health care provider (Fotaki et al. 2008). In a Dutch study, higher-
educated patients did not indicate considering their GP’s advice as important as other, 
less-educated patients, which indicates different approaches by different subgroups. 
However, quality information was not mentioned as a factor of influence on their 
choice and, in addition, findings no longer proved significant after multivariate 
 analysis (Lako and Rosenau 2009). Other studies find that higher education probably 
does increase both the response of patients to quality information and the awareness 
of such information in general. Apart from education, other factors also lead to 
differences in the use of performance information in making choices. Some studies 
found that females and ethnic minorities value health care quality information more 
(Harris and Buntin 2008; Kolstad and Chernew 2009). In contrast, Schneider and 
Epstein (1998) in their study on the influence of cardiac surgery performance 
information on cardiac patients’ hospital choice found that men seemed somewhat 
more likely to be aware of hospital performance rankings than women. Their findings 
furthermore strongly suggested factors such as age, level of education and health 
status as influencing such awareness. Length of sickness period and income level also 
seemed to play a role here. 
Internal effects of accounting for performance 
Public managers and public organizations change their behaviors to anticipate 
external reactions to their published performance outcomes. The performance 
management literature is divided about whether performance information and 
performance measurement actually lead to better quality services, and has given 
considerable attention to dysfunctional effects (Werner and Asch 2005; Smith 1995). 
Such dysfunctional effects range from excessive attention for what is easily 
measurable, over a fixation on targets and indicators, to outright gaming. In the latter, 
public organizations deliberately underperform in order to avoid higher targets in a 
subsequent year. 
A result is that performance metrics may crowd out other processes of priority 
setting in organizations. Such metrics have also become increasingly important in the 
evaluation of personnel. A failure to achieve (internally or externally) defined targets 
 is then a reason to deny promotion or to terminate employment. Success in achieving 
targets brands one as a good manager and greatly facilitates job transfers. 
Measuring performance is by definition a conservative undertaking. Good 
measurement systems and well-functioning performance accountability systems only 
operate in stable environments with a great deal of standardization (Meijer 2005). 
Diverging from the norm or standard is risky for an organization, because it results in 
lower performance—as measured by the standard. While performance reporting may 
indeed increase accountability and stimulate organizations to improve, it may at the 
same time stifle more far-reaching innovation and stimulate risk avoidance through 
strong homogenizing tendencies. While the logic behind the introduction of 
performance reporting systems suggested more democratic types of accountability 
systems where individual users would be able to hold organizations to account, this 
standardization seems to suggest a shift of power to the standard-setters. These can be 
central government, professional bodies, consumer organizations, or news media. 
Within organizations, this may mean a greater importance for management and 
organizations’ technostructures, to the detriment of the power of professionals. A 
related effect is that accountability requirements have been found to be very 
bureaucratic and resource-consuming (Gregory 2003). Finally, the easy availability of 
a wide range of performance metrics may facilitate attack politics, where performance 
information is not in the first place used for accountability or improvement purposes, 
but to launch attacks on organizations or persons through a selective use of data 
(Flinders 2011). Performance information is then not used to make a balanced 
assessment but only to support pre-existing structures and attitudes. Yet the question 
remains whether this really is a departure from other forms of accountability, or only a 
change in the arguments and tools. 
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